Why We're Failing in Iraq

After we were attacked by Al Queda I—like many Americans—felt a need for payback. 9/11 created a sense of unity in our country, something that may not have existed since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

We were scared. We wanted retribution. We wanted to know who had done this to us, how it happened, and why. But most of all we wanted the culprits caught and destroyed. Mentally and emotionally we were ready for war. Tens of thousands of our finest young men and women volunteered for military service. They wanted to defend our country from its sworn enemies. With the image of George W. Bush addressing recovery workers on the rumble of the World Trade Center, we left it up to our new president and his team to carry us through to ultimate victory.

So with that mindset, we watched as our armed services successfully wrested control of Afghanistan from its radical Taliban leaders. But one of our main objectives, to kill or capture Bin Laden, failed.

Why?

Then the administration began touting the danger posed to us from Iraq. We were told that the Iraqis had huge stocks of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) stockpiled throughout their country. Supposedly they were in bed with Bin Laden and would supply these weapons to the terrorists. The case was made for attacking Iraq.

How did this happen and why?

With our overwhelming military force we had no problem defeating the conventional Iraqi army. Iraqi citizens were dancing in the streets with joy. We felt that we were liberators. At that point we had an opportunity to stabilize the country with a series of intelligent decisions. But the decisions that were made only led to hostility and persistent attacks on our service personnel. Four years later, with over 3,000 dead and more than 20,000 wounded, those attacks continue.

Why? How did we screw up so badly?

The answers to many of those questions are revealed in a new book by Andrew Cockburn, RUMSFELD, His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy ($16.50 in hardback at Amazon.com). It is a scathing attack against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, his leadership of the military establishment, and the decisions he forced through regarding our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. While I don’t know enough to concur with all of the author’s conclusions, the book offers fascinating insights into Donald Rumsfeld’s ambition which was limitless, his intellect which was overestimated, and his management style which was Machiavellian.

We may be analyzing what went wrong in Iraq for years to come, but if you are interested in the subject and those questions plague you as they did me, then this book is a fine start.

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